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comment 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers 
to the Wrong Question 
Prisoners of war (POWs) enjoy special rights under the Geneva 
Conventions that “enemy combatants” detained in Guantánamo do not have, 
including the right to be tried in the same courts and according to the same 
procedures as members of the detaining power’s armed forces.1 Under the 
Geneva Conventions, captured combatants are entitled to POW status until 
any doubt regarding their status has been properly adjudicated by a 
“competent tribunal.”2 The U.S. government3 and several commentators4 have 
argued that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which were 
established to determine the enemy combatant status of Guantánamo detainees 
and which completed their work in March 2005, properly adjudicated the POW 
status of the detainees.5  
 
1.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 102, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]. 
2.  Id. art. 5. 
3.  See Brief for the Respondents at 42 n.18, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 
05-184), available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/HamdanSGmeritsbrief.pdf; 
Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, Defense Department Special Briefing on Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/ 
tr20050329-2382.html (“Justice O’Connor . . . said [in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld] that one of the 
remedies she felt was to have a process like Army Regulation 190-8 [implementing Article 
5]. So we have implemented that for all of the detainees. And as I said before, we’ve actually 
gone beyond that.”). 
4.  See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President’s War Power 
Necessarily Remains “The Power To Wage War Successfully,” 53 DRAKE L. REV. 851, 888 
(2005); Paul Rosenzweig, On Liberty and Terror in the Post-9/11 World: A Response to Professor 
Chemerinsky, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 29, 38 (2005). 
5.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld did not reach the issue. 
Hamdan confirmed that Guantánamo detainees enjoy Geneva Convention protection but 
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 This Comment argues that the CSRTs were not competent to deny POW 
status because they were charged only with identifying enemy combatants, a 
broad category that by its own terms includes many POWs. Given the 
substantial overlap between the definitions of “enemy combatant” and “POW,” 
a CSRT’s affirmative enemy combatant determination actually supports a 
detainee’s POW status. Thus, even after their enemy combatant status has 
been adjudicated by the CSRTs, Guantánamo detainees should still be treated 
as presumptive POWs. 
Part I of this Comment discusses presumptive POW status and the 
historical role of tribunals in adjudicating that status. Part II explains how 
CSRTs depart from that tradition and why their enemy combatant 
determinations cannot be used to rebut the Geneva Conventions’ presumption 
of POW status. The Comment concludes by suggesting solutions to the 
dilemma posed by the overlapping definitions of “enemy combatant” and 
“POW.” 
i. presumptive and conclusive pow status 
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(GPW) governs the definition, classification, and treatment of POWs.6 Under 
Article 5 of the GPW, captured combatants whose status is in doubt are entitled 
to POW status until a “competent tribunal” determines otherwise: 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a 
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to 
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [defining POWs], such 
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such 
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.7 
Article 5 thus implicitly recognizes both presumptive POWs—detainees whose 
status is in question but who have not yet had an Article 5 hearing—and 
conclusive POWs, who have been expressly adjudicated as such.8 Unless and 
until a competent tribunal determines otherwise, a detainee about whom any 
 
explicitly reserved judgment on whether Salim Ahmed Hamdan’s status as a “potential” 
prisoner of war had been properly adjudicated. 126 S. Ct. at 2795 & n.61. 
6.  GPW, supra note 1. 
7.  Id. art. 5. 
8.  I owe many thanks to Stephen Vladeck for encouraging me to address this issue and for 
clarifying my thinking on it.  
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doubt exists remains a presumptive POW entitled to the full panoply of GPW 
rights. 
American military regulations and practice have historically recognized 
presumptive POW status. For instance, Army Regulation 190-8, which was 
“adopted to implement the Geneva Convention,”9 echoes the language of 
Article 5: 
A competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not 
appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a 
belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed 
forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a 
prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists.10 
During the Vietnam War, the Army implemented Regulation 190-8 by 
requiring an “Article 5 tribunal” to determine the POW status of each captured 
Viet Cong belligerent.11 Consistent with the GPW’s recognition of presumptive 
POW status, the Army classified North Vietnamese and Viet Cong detainees as 
POWs until such a tribunal reached a contrary conclusion.12 The United States 
continued to convene Article 5 tribunals to resolve doubts about the POW 
 
9.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 550 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring). Army Regulation 
190-8 cites the Geneva Conventions as the basis for its interpretation. Army Reg. 190-8 § 1-
1(b) (1997), available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r190_8.pdf. 
10.  Army Reg. 190-8 § 1-6(b); see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (“[I]t is notable that military 
regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be 
made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status 
under the Geneva Convention.”). U.S. military field manuals also recognize presumptive 
POW status. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 
para. 71 (1956); see also DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET NO. 110-31, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS para. 3-
3(c)(2) (1976) (“Upon capture any person, who does not appear to be entitled to [prisoner 
of war] status, but who had committed a belligerent act is required to be treated as a 
[prisoner of war] until his status is properly determined.”). 
11.  60 DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR 722-31, 748-51 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979) 
(reproducing U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Directive 381-46); 
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 754, 
768 (1968) [hereinafter Contemporary Practice] (reproducing a portion of MACV Directive 
20-5). 
12.  See Contemporary Practice, supra note 11, at 766-68 (reproducing MACV Directive 381-46, 
annex A). Like the Taliban, the Viet Cong were initially denied POW status. See Daryl A. 
Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions To Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 326 (2002). 
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status of combatants captured during the conflict in Grenada13 and the Persian 
Gulf War.14 
ii. the intersection between enemy combatant and pow 
status 
At Guantánamo, the U.S. government has departed from its own long-held 
practice. Rather than convening Article 5 tribunals to verify detainees’ POW 
status, the government has claimed that the CSRTs fulfilled Article 5’s 
mandate. But Article 5 tribunals and CSRTs exist for different purposes and 
are charged with making different adjudications: whereas Article 5 tribunals 
exist to determine POW status, the CSRTs were created to classify enemy 
combatants.15 The CSRTs did not—and were never asked to—determine 
detainees’ POW status. Indeed, on at least one occasion, the Legal Advisor to 
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals upheld a CSRT’s refusal to hear 
evidence relating to POW status because “Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
do not have the discretion to determine that a detainee should be classified as a 
prisoner of war—only whether the detainee satisfies the definition of ‘enemy 
combatant.’”16 Furthermore, as explained above, a process must dispel doubt of 
POW status in order to strip a detainee of protection as a presumptive POW.17 
Because the CSRTs made no findings that disproved, or even addressed, POW 
status, they were plainly insufficient to meet Article 5’s mandate. 
 
13.  See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES” IN 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 37 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/ 
RL31367.pdf. 
14.  See DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 663 
(1992), available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf. According to Department 
of Defense documents, nearly 1200 tribunals “were conducted to verify status” during the 
Persian Gulf War, 310 of which found that the detainee was entitled to conclusive POW 
status. Id. 
15.  See Vijay Sekhon, More Questions than Answers: The Indeterminacy Surrounding Enemy 
Combatants Following Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 9 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005); Neil A. Lewis, 
Scrutiny of Review Tribunals as War Crimes Trials Open, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at A12. 
The CSRTs were established as a direct response to the Supreme Court’s June 2004 ruling 
in Hamdi that “a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant [must] be given a 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral 
decisionmaker.” 542 U.S. at 509. 
16.  Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal 3 (Dec. 16, 2004), http://wid.ap.org/documents/detainees/ moazzambegg.pdf. 
17.  See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
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When Guantánamo detainees and their lawyers raised this Article 5 issue in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,18 the government responded that the CSRTs had fulfilled 
Article 5’s requirements as a byproduct of adjudicating enemy combatant 
status, and that detainees designated as enemy combatants thereby lost their 
presumptive POW status. In its brief, the government argued that the CSRT 
process “clearly discharges any obligation under Article 5.”19 Senator Lindsey 
Graham went even further, labeling the CSRTs “Article 5 tribunals on 
steroids.”20 The government21 and the scholars who supported its position22 
focused on the procedural protections available to detainees appearing before 
the CSRTs. By doing so, they largely ignored a more fundamental point: 
because of the substantial similarities between the definitions of “enemy 
combatant” and “prisoner of war,” classification as an enemy combatant by a 
CSRT actually supports, rather than precludes, a finding of POW status. Thus, 
the CSRTs could not strip detainees of their presumptive POW status simply 
by finding them to be enemy combatants. 
The Bush Administration has defined an enemy combatant as anyone “who 
was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that 
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. 
This definition includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has 
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”23 Courts have 
noted that this definition is “vague and overly broad.”24 In addition to covering 
a “little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a 
charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance 
al-Qaeda activities,”25 the expansive definition includes persons clearly covered 
by Article 4 of the GPW, which defines prisoners of war. 
 
18.  Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 18 n.36, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 
05-184), available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/HAMDANFINAL.march15.reply.pdf. 
The author worked as research assistant to Professor Neal Katyal, who represented Hamdan 
before the Supreme Court. The opinions expressed in this Comment are the author’s alone 
and do not represent those of Professor Katyal or the Hamdan litigation team. 
19.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 42. 
20.  151 CONG. REC. S12,754 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham). 
21.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 42 n.18 (“The CSRT was patterned after the 
‘competent tribunal’ described in Geneva Convention Article 5 and Army Regulation 190-8 
. . . but provides more process.”). 
22.  See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 4, at 888-89. 
23.  Dep’t of Def., Guantanamo Detainee Processes 2 (June 9, 2006), http://www.defenselink. 
mil/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf [hereinafter Guantanamo Detainee Processes]. 
24.  E.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 474 (D.D.C. 2005). 
25.  Id. at 475 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Article 4(A)(1) of the GPW extends POW status to “[m]embers of the 
armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or 
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.”26 This definition covers 
both the Taliban—which the Bush Administration has acknowledged is 
protected by the Geneva Convention27—and units of al Qaeda, to the degree 
that they formed part of Taliban armed forces.28 The Taliban’s reliance on 
shifting alliances with independent groups and warlords indicates that units or 
members of al Qaeda may have acted as part of the Taliban armed forces, 
bringing them within the plain language of Article 4(A)(1).29 Indeed, the 
government has repeatedly recognized, and even argued, that the Taliban and 
al Qaeda were “tied tightly at the waist” and “functioned” together.30 The 
second relevant POW category, defined in Article 4(A)(4), grants POW status 
to “[p]ersons who accompany the armed forces without actually being 
members thereof.”31 This broad category appears to cover support personnel 
such as drivers or medics.32 Moreover, Article 5 essentially extends the reach of 
these categories by granting POW status to detainees about whom any doubt 
exists. 
 
26.  GPW, supra note 1, art. 4(A)(1). 
27.  Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 
7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (“[T]he 
Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees.”); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift 
Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A11. 
28.  In a memorandum circulated on July 7, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England 
announced that the detainees at Guantánamo must be treated in accordance with Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, but he noted that “aside from the military commission 
procedures,” which the Court had invalidated in Hamdan, “existing DoD orders, policies, 
directives, execute orders, and doctrine comply with the standards of Common Article 3.” 
Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts 
et al. 1 (July 7, 2006), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/genevaconsmemo.pdf. It appears, 
therefore, that the problems this Comment identifies with the CSRTs and Article 5 will not 
be addressed in the response to this most recent memorandum. 
29.  See Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Special Forces Step Up Campaign in Afghan 
Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at A1 (discussing “alliances of convenience”). For example, 
al Qaeda reportedly aided the Taliban military in its struggle against the Northern Alliance. 
See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA 58-60 (2002). 
30.  Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Remarks on Ferry from Air Terminal to Main Base, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Jan. 27, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/ 
t01282002_t0127sd2.html.  
31.  GPW, supra note 1, art. 4(A)(4). 
32.  Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the petitioner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), was 
allegedly a driver for Osama bin Laden. See Andrew Zajac, Free Hand Urged for Tribunal; Bin 
Laden Driver’s Case Could Affect Detainee Prosecutions, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2005, at 20. 
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The newly created definition of “enemy combatant” fails to exclude these 
POW categories and, as a result, its application by the CSRTs cannot be used 
to justify denial of POW status. To take one clear example, the definition of 
“enemy combatant” includes any “individual who was part of or supporting 
Taliban or al Qaeda forces.”33 By its plain terms, this would include even the 
most obvious example of a prisoner of war defined in Article 4(A)(1)—
“[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict.” Similarly, the broad 
definition of “enemy combatant,” including those “supporting Taliban or al 
Qaeda forces,” also covers Article 4(A)(4) POWs “who accompany the armed 
forces without actually being members thereof.” Though the administration 
has recognized that “the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban 
detainees,”34 it has simultaneously denied them POW status based on their 
membership in the Taliban, which the government says qualifies them as 
enemy combatants. In fact, Department of Defense documents show that fully 
50% of detainees appearing before the CSRTs were alleged to be either Taliban 
or both al Qaeda and Taliban.35 The CSRTs’ own publicized findings confirm 
that members of the Taliban were classified as enemy combatants based at least 
in part on their membership in the Taliban.36  
Even if the CSRTs had been empowered to affirmatively grant POW 
status, the overlap between the definitions of “enemy combatant” and 
“prisoner of war” would have presented detainees with a paralyzing Catch-22. 
If a detainee treated the tribunal as an Article 5 proceeding and tried to 
establish POW status—by demonstrating membership in the Taliban armed 
forces, for example—he would simultaneously prove himself to be an 
 
33.  Guantanamo Detainee Processes, supra note 23, at 2. 
34.  Office of the White House Press Sec’y, supra note 27. 
35.  Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, The Guantanamo Detainees: The Government’s Story 
8, http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 
2006). For the voluminous, though partially redacted, proceedings of the CSRTs, see U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., Documents Concerning Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) 
Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). 
36.  See Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, at NOV00091, 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/CSRT_JTF_GTMO_documents.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2006) (“[T]his Detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and is a 
member of, or affiliated with, Al Qaida and the Taliban.”); id. at NOV00100 (upholding an 
enemy combatant determination because, among other things, the “detainee voluntarily 
joined the Taliban” and “the detainee agreed to fight with the Taliban”); id. at NOV00115 
(“[T]his detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and was part of or 
supporting Taliban and Al Qaida forces.”); id. at NOV00147 (“[T]his detainee is properly 
classified as an enemy combatant and was part of or supporting Taliban forces, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”). 
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“individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces” and thus 
an enemy combatant, which, the government would argue, precluded POW 
status. Conversely, if a detainee treated the tribunal as a CSRT and tried to 
avoid the enemy combatant label—by denying involvement with the Taliban, 
for example—he would simultaneously give up the chance to establish POW 
status as a member of a hostile armed force. In effect, the only way out of the 
dilemma would be to deny any involvement with the Taliban or al Qaeda, even 
though membership in the former would entitle the detainee to POW status 
under both Article 4 and the Bush Administration’s own public statements. 
conclusion 
The CSRTs have completed their work and have been disbanded, but the 
impact of their findings remains unclear. This Comment has argued that 
irrespective of their procedural protections or the accuracy with which they 
identified “enemy combatants,” the CSRTs did not fulfill Article 5’s mandate. 
As a result, they did not and could not strip detainees of their presumptive 
POW status. Ironically, the CSRTs’ enemy combatant determinations actually 
provide a relatively solid basis for transforming presumptive POWs into 
conclusive POWs. 
If the Bush Administration truly wants to vindicate Article 5, the solution is 
straightforward: disentangle the definitions of “enemy combatant” and 
“prisoner of war,” and establish tribunals to determine the latter. To separate 
the definitions, the simplest solution would be to narrow the ever-expanding 
definition of “enemy combatant” so that it would correspond with “unlawful 
combatant,” the term used in the GPW to refer to combatants who do not fall 
within any of Article 4’s categories. This change would obviate the need for 
separate tribunals and would boil the question down to the single inquiry 
contemplated by the GPW: whether a detainee was entitled to POW status 
under Article 4. Until competent tribunals answer this question in accordance 
with Article 5, the Guantánamo detainees remain presumptive POWs, and 
courts considering the post-Hamdan Guantánamo cases should treat them as 
such. 
As Congress and the executive create new tribunals in Guantánamo, Iraq, or 
elsewhere, they must consider more than just the legislative authorization and 
procedural protections required by Hamdan. This Comment suggests that to 
give full effect to the Geneva Conventions, Congress must first disentangle the 
definitions of “enemy combatant” and “prisoner of war.” Procedural changes 
alone are not an answer when the tribunals begin with the wrong question.  
joseph blocher  
